Herbert B. Maw, Wendell B. Hammond and George K. Fadel v. Brack Howard Noble and Ann C. Noble : Brief of Defendants and Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
Herbert B. Maw, Wendell B. Hammond and
George K. Fadel v. Brack Howard Noble and Ann
C. Noble : Brief of Defendants and Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Cotro-Manes & Cotro-Manes; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Maw v. Noble, No. 9107 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3432
6i'Ffl"fZ]" w 
nnw·6'WW!~'-
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAJi I L E [ 
0 CT ~~~ 0 1959 
-~-------ci; -: ·-s~;::~~·;;;;--c-~~ri.--u+;h-·~ 
HERBERT B+ MAW, WENDELL B. 
HAM~IOND and GEORGE K. 
FADEL~ 
Plaintiffs and RespondentS1 
vs .. 
BRACK HOWARD NOBLE and ANN 
C. NOBLE, his wife~ 
Defendants and AppellantJ .. 
Case No. 
9107 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
COTRO-MANES & COTRO .. MANES 
AttorneyJ fo, Defendants and Appellants 
~ LUll ~~~~~~:-:&:--::::::::::::::::::::: 
..... ?-~~~...::::..~~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF F AC :TS -------------- _________ ___ ___ ______ ___ ___ ___ ___ _________________ 3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ------------·····-··~-···-·-----·--·---------·········~··--- 6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 0 NE --------------- ----- __________________________ . _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 7 
A CONTRACT OF E~fPLOYMENT BETWEEN AN AT-
TORNEY AND A CLIENT~ IF TIIERE IS A1-fBIGUITY~ 
MUST AS A MATTER Of' LAW BE CONSTRUED 
AGAINST THE ATTORNEY AND FOR THE CLIENT. 
POINT 1""\X'O .. ~ ·····r···- .. ----· ------------------ ___ ____ ___ ________ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ _____ 8 
INTEREST AWARDED IN A CONDEMNATION SUIT 
UNDER UTAH LAW IS AWARDED AS A MATTER OF 
RIGHT AND NOT AS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL DIS-
CRETION. 
POINT THREE ______ . u ••••••• ____ -- _ -- _ -- _ -- _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ ___ _ _ 11 
A CONTINGENT I~EE CONTRACT WHICH EXCLUDES 
$80,000.00 FROM THE COMPUTAT'ION OF ATTORNEY 
FEES, LIKEWISE~ AS A MATTER Olt LAW, EXCLUDES 
THE ACCRUED INTEREST UPON THAT AMOUNT+ 
POINT FOUR ____________________________ .. ~. __ .. ~ .. ~- ....... r.- ~~.--. r~.- •• -~. r~. ~~ •••• r•. r• l 7 
A CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEYS 
FEES WHICH IS BASED UPON OBTAINING COMPEN~ 
SATION FOR LAND BEING CONDEMNED DOES NOT 
INCLUDE AS PART OF THE RECOVERY THE INTEREST 
PAID AS At\" INCIDENT TO THE RECOVERY. 
POINT FIVE ________ --·~ ··~· ------- ~·· ~ ........... r •. --- r--~~--- ~-- ------------------------- 2 2 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON ALL 
SUMS ADVANCED PLAINTlr'FS FROM THE TIME OF 
THE ADVANCE UNTIL TIME WHEN PLAINTIFFS 
WERE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
CONCLUSION -- -·~·--------··~----------···r~·-----------------··~··~··· ... -··~··r··· ···~···· 24 
.• 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t' 
Page 
APPEND IX A ... ~ ... _ .. __ .. __ .. ____ . __ .. __ .. __ ... __ .. __ . __ . _ ... _ .. __ .. __ . __ .. __ .. __ .. ___ .. -~... 2 S 
AGREEl\-IENl' FOR EMPLOYl\-fENT OF ATTORNEYS, 
dated J aoua.ry 12 ~ 19 56. 
CASES CITED 
Atlantic Coastline R. Co. v. Coaclunan~ .59 Fla. 130) 52 So. 3 3 7, 
20 Ann. Ca.s. 1047 -------------··· ___________ ...... ·~····· .. ·~---~-------------------· 21 
Bassford v. Johnson~ 172 N.Y. 488, 65 N.E. i60 ...... 14, 151 20, 22 
B lak.eslcc · s Storage Warehouse v ~ Chicago, 3 69 Ill. 480 ~ 17 N. E. 
2d l, 120 A.L.R. 71 5 ----------··· ---~--······~··~--~------------------------·····- 10 
Candelaria v. Cutierrez~ 28 N. M. 434~ 213 P. 103 7 __________________ .. 21 
Chapa1is v. City of Chkago, 389 Ill. 269~ 59 N.E. 2d 641 ···-···· 10 
Covert v. Randles, 53 Ariz. 22\ 87 P .2d 488 .. ··------------------------ 13t 17 
Fell 'T. Union Pacific Ry. Co.t 32 U. 10 l, 8H P. 1003, lOOj ___________ ~ 9 
Hollingsworth v. Lewis, 9) Cal. A pp. 5 26, 269 P. 709 ________________ 19 
Oregon Shortlinc R. Co. v. Fox~ 28 U. 311, 78 P. 800 ____________________ 22 
Pinto v. Seely, 22 CaL App. 3I8t 135 P. 43 -------------------------------- 8 
People Ex Rel v. Kellyt Mayor et al, 32 N.E. 2d 920~ 921, 922} 
92 3 ~ .. ~- .. -... -- .. --.---.---.---. -~-. --.--- .. --------- ... -.. -- ...... -- ...... ~~ ... -... -.... ---.--- 19 
Sanders v. Riddicht 127 Tenn. 701 t 156 S.W. 464 ~-··--·--~-- 12, 13~ 22 
San Pedro} L.A. & S.L. Ry. Co. v. Board of Education, 35 U. 13, 
99 p. 263, 267 ~~······~···~··-~··~~~·········~·····---~--------------------------·---- 9 
Smith v. Whitman, 159 Md. 478~ 1 )0 A. 856 ____________________________ 15~ 16 
State v. Danielsen~ 122 V~ 220, 247 P .2d 900 -------------------------- 9~ 10 
State v. Noble~ ____ U. --·-) ____ P.2d ·-~· ---··-~·------------------------------------ 7) 15 
State v. Peekj 1 U. 2d 263) 265 P.2d 630 -------------------------------------- 10 
Vitagraph v. American Theatre Co., 77 U. 71~ 291 P_. 303J 306 __ 20~ 21 
Waugh et al v. Q. & C. Co. ct al, CCA 7th (1926) 16 F.2d 36J____ 8 
STATUTES CITED 
.. 
. ··- .. 
15~ 1-l, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ---------------------------------------------- 9 
Rule 52~ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ---------------------------------------- 24 
TEXTS CITED 
2 Affierican Law ·Reports~ annotation, 844 ---~------------·~···~··~ .. ~------·- 7 
3 American Juris prudence~ p. 660, Appeal and Error~ Sec. 114 7 _... 2 3 
.5 Amcrkan Jurisprudence! p. 356~ Attorneys at law, s~c. 159 --·- s 
12 Am ex i~an ] ur isp.r;uqence f'~ 77 2 ~ Contra~· Sec. 2 41 .. _ .. __ . . ~~~. ~ 20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HERBERT B. MAW~ \\!Et\DHI .. L B~ 
HAMMOND and GEORGE K. 
FADEL~ 
Plaintiffs and Respondentst 
vs. 
BRACK HOWARD NOHLf and ANN 
C~ NOBLE~ his wife~ 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No+ 
9107 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND Al:ll1ELLANrl'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above entitled matter was tried, without a jury, on 
the 25th day of May~ 1959. From a judgment in the sum of 
$11~250 .. 58 in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants appeal. 
This matter arose over the question of attorney fees .. In·. 195 5 
the clef endants, as owners of land located on the Salt Lake-
Davis County lines, were named as patty defertdants .. "iri a 
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condemnation suit by the State of lJ tah who sought to conL 
demn their land for the use of a highway. The defendants 
retained the services of Herbert B. Maw, one of the above 
named plaintiffs, to repres.en t them in the litigation. Subse· 
quently, at the defendants' request~ George Fadel and Wendell 
B. Hammond were associated in the case .. Shortly thereafter 
an ~\Agreement for Employment of Attorneys'~ \\7as entered 
into betw-een the above named parties+ A copy of the employ~ 
ment agreement is attached to this brief and marked Appendix 
A. 
After a protracted litigation, the Supreme Court of 0tah 
affirmed a judgment in favor of. t..he de£ endants in the su~n 
of $140,000.00+ On March 11, 1959, the State of Utah paid 
over to the de f eodants all amounts due under the judgment 
which had not been paid prior thereto~ the total amount being 
$169, 5 21.07 ~ This sum represented ·the principal amount of 
the judgment of $140 ~ 000.00, and accumulated interest dating 
from the time of taking in 1955 in the sum of $29,521.07+ 
The state~ in making payment to the defendants, named the 
plaintiffs as joint payees of the final settlement check. There-
after the pla1ntiffs submitted to the defendants a statement 
of the division of the judgment paid by the State of Utah 
(Ex hi bit No. 12) ~. Th c p 1 a.intiffs asserted _that the interest 
amounting to $29,521.0~ was a parr of the recovery and there-
fore was to be pro rated out in accordance with the agreement 
of employment, which in this case made one-half of the interest 
payable to the attorneys as fees. The defendants contended 
that the interest was to be di v i4ed~ pro· rata~ between the plain· 
tiffs and the defendants~ based upon what each was entitled 
to of the $I40JOOO.OO under the employment contract. The 
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defendants rejected the accounting of the plaintiffs~ who 
thereupon refused to surrender the check to the defendants 
for the balance due from the State of Ctah. The plaintiffs 
imm.ed iately commenced a suit, and upon stipulation between 
counsel the check was cashed and $12)000.00 of said check was 
deposited with the Clerk of Court pending the outcome of 
the suit. The balance of the moneys received from the check 
were paid to plaintiffs and defendants as. their interest appeared 
under the agreement. 
The plaintiffs in their com plaint aile g cd that $1,9 7 5. 00 
co 11 ected by the defend a 0 ts some two years be£ ore as s ettl ew 
ment of a condemnation suit in Davis County, Utah~ \vas 
subject to the contract and there.fore they were entitled to 
$ 9S 7. 50 of that amount. This assertion was not contained in 
the accounting submitted by the attorneys before filing suit. 
The defendants filed an answer to the plaintiffs' com plaint and 
counterclaimed) alleging that the defendants \Vere entitled 
to interest on certain sums advanced the plaintiffs as advance 
attorney fees. 
The plaintiffs maintained at the trial that the interest 
.accumulated since the taking of the property above referred 
to J including the interest on the $80,000.00 \V hich was exempt 
under the tertns o £ the contract) 'vas a part of the j ud gm en t) 
and therefore divisible under the agreement by and between 
the parties herein. 
On the other hand, tbe defendants con tended that the 
interest accumulated on the $80~000.00 exempt under the terms 
of the agreement was not a part of the judgment~ ~nd there-:. 
fore plain tiffs could not and shou 1 d not partici pat~ and di yide;· 
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that interest+ 
r urther, the de fen d.ants asserted and contended that the 
interest over and above that on the $80~000 .00 should be 
divided by and behveen the parties herein upon toe basis of 
the ptopo rtion of the principal, to-wit. $140 ~ 000 + 00, to which 
each was entitled. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
A contract of employment between a.n attorney and a 
eli en t~ if there is ambiguity, must as a matter of law be con-
strued against the attorney and for the client. 
POINT TWO 
Interest awarded in a condemnation suit under U tab law is 
a v.,rarded as a matter of right and not as a matter of judicial 
discretion. 
POINT THREE 
A contingent fee contract which excludes $80,000.00 from 
the computation of attorney fees} likewise, as a matter of law~ 
excludes the accrued interest upon that amount. 
POINT FOUR 
A contingent fee contract for attorneys fee5 which is based 
upon obtaining compensation for land being condemned does 
not include as part of the recovery the interest paid as an inci-
dent to the recovery~ 
POINT FIVE 
De£ endants are entitled to interest on all sums advanced 
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plaintiffs from the time of the advance until time \Vhen plain~ 
tiffs were entitled to attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 01\E 
A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN AN 
ATTORNEY AND A CLIENT, If THERE IS AMBIGUil'Y~ 
MUST AS A MATTER OF LAW BE CONSTRUED 
AGAINST THE ATTORNEY AND fOR THE CLIENT. 
The annotator 1vriting in 2 ALR 844 sets forth the general 
law of the American courts in the opening paragraph of his 
work in stating: 
nit is a general la\\' that? on account of the confi-
dential relation betvieen them, contracts made betw-een 
an attorney and a eli en t, a£ ter the tela tio n has been 
established, are to be construed against the attorney. H 
It is undisputed that this contract \Vas entered into some 
months after the employment of the p laintHI attorneys by the 
defendants to protect their interests and defend them in the 
suit filed by the State of Utah condemning their land. (R~ 23, 
R. 29, Exhibit 1-D, Exhibit 2-P) State of Utah v. Noble, 
---- U I r~~~ P2d ---- p 
The ambiguity which is contained within this contract 
is \vhether or not interest should become a part of the !Lamount 
recovered':> and be_ divided as set fa rth in the contract, or 
\\' hether or not the interest should be divided pro rata between 
the parties based upon -~vhat each party is entitled to based upon 
the principal amount recovered~ which \Vas $140, 000.00~ 
The California courts in speaking on the subject of 
attorney rei i en t con tracts where there is an ambiguity as to the 
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intent of the parti cs, stated in the case of Pin to v. See 1 y, 2 2 
CaL App. 318~ 135 P. 43: 
''It may be conceded that in construing contracts 
behveen attorneys and clients concerning compensa· 
tion~ in ~ .. hich there is any ambiguity as to the intent 
of the parties, it is the rule., generally accepted by the 
courts, to adopt such a construction of· the contract as 
will be most favorable to the interests of the client." 
The £ ederal courts in addition to the state courts have 
adopted the rule that where doubtful or ambiguous language in 
an agreement for fees h.as been used the agreement nlust be 
construed most favorably to the client~ Waugh et aL v. Q & C 
Co~ et al., CCA 7th, ( 1926) 16 F.2d 363 .. Other authorities 
citing the general rule are: 5 Am Jur 356~ Attorneys at Law, 
Sect. 159; 7 CJS 1055, Attorney and Client, Sect. 182; Re~ 
statement of Lav.r\ Contractsl Sec. 236l p. 330. 
Based upon the above d ted authorities~ the contract noVt)" 
before this court~ must, as a matter of law~ be construed in 
the light most favorable to the Nobles and against the interests 
of the attorneys. 
A duty devolved upon the attorneys to affirmatively define 
what was meant by the terms ''any amount recovered~' and 
nall amounts recoveredn in the contract of employment itsel£7 
Their failure to do so must be construed against them, and 
there£ ore the inclusion of in teres t in to ~~all amounts recovered,· 
is erroneous and the district court in ruling that the interest 
should be included was in error. 
POINT TWO 
INTEREST AWARDED IN A CONDEMNATION 
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SUIT UNDER G1'AH LAW IS AWARDED AS A MATTER 
OF RIGHT AND NOT AS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL 
DISCRETION. 
Interest has been defined as; 
t'lnterest is compensation for the use or forbearance 
of money.~t 
30 Am Jur 7, Interest, Sect. 2 
The Utah courts recognize that interest is compensation 
for the use of money or prope.rty and have so held. The 
Supreme Court in ruling on the matter stated: 
HI£ he had loaned the money to someone, he certainly 
would be entitled to interest, and if he borrowed it 
from someone:t he Vi.rould J ikcl y have to pay interest for 
its use. By being awarded legal interest, therefore) he 
is simply placed in status quo~ a.nd nothing short of 
thi.s is full compensation, and that is just what the law 
aims to accomplish+·~ 
Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. 
32 U. 101:- 88 P. 1003, 1005 
This case was cited w lth approval in the condemnation 
suit of San Pedro, L.A. & S.L. Ry. Co. v+ Board of Education 
of Salt Lake City) 35 U. 13, 99 Pr 263, 267. This court has 
ruled that in a condemnation suit, interest rna y be given only 
.at 6 per cent, the statutory legal rate~ under 15-1·1~ Utah Code 
Annotated, 19 53) which provides: 
~·Leg~l Rate.-The legal rate of interest for the loan 
or forbearance of any money] goods or things in action 
shall be sjx per cent per ann urn. tt 
This was set forth in the Utah case of State v+ Danielsen, 
122 L1 • 220~ 247 P.2d 900. The basis upon which the court 
has ruled that the 6 per cent is applicable is that until final 
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determination there i 5 no judgment, and as there is a 4: 4£ or w 
bearance" the statutory amount must apply. 
The interest which is av./arded in condemnation suits in 
the State of Utah is not a \V arded as a judicial act as s. uch~ but 
is awarded by the mandate of the legislature, which passed 
legislation v.rhich makes jt mandatory to pay interest where 
there is a 4. 4 forbearance'~ of money+ This principle has been 
recognized by this court in many cases. State v. Daniel sen~ 
122 U. 220~ 247 P.2d 900; State v. Peek, 1 U.2d 263, 265 
P.2d 630. 
In the leading Illinois. case of Blakeslee's Storage \\l are-
house v+ Chicago, 369 IlL 480~ 17 ~E 2d 1, 120 ALR 715~ the 
court declared: 
~'In determining whether interest on a judgment is 
a part of itl the character of a judgment and the 
authority for imposing interest are important factors 
to be considered. A judgment is the sentence of the Jaw 
pronounced by the court upon the rna tter contained in 
the record. 3 Blackstone~s Com. 395~ It is the law'.s 
last 'vord in a judicial controversy and may be defined 
as the :final consideration and determination of a court 
upon matters submitted to it in an action or proceed-
ing. 15 RCL~ Judgments, 569. A judgment is the 
judicti,tl act of the court Dorman v. Usbe Building and 
Loan Assn~ 115 NJL 337, 180 A. 413. On the other 
hand the right to in teres t a part from con tract~ such a.s 
inter est on a judgm cnt, does not emanate from the con· 
troversy, or from the judgment, or from anything of 
a judicial natwe. ·~ 
In a later Ill ina is case of Ch a pal.i s v ~ Gty of Chicago~ 
38 9 Ill+ 269, 59 N ~E. 2d 641, the Supr erne Court affirmed the 
Blakeslee's case and said: 
t tin the latter case ( Blakesleets) it was said, ~If 
10 
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appellant is entitled to interest on the judgment it is 
not by virtue of the judgment or the judicial proceed~ 
ing culminating therein) but arises solei y under the 
provisions of the statute~'' 
Interest, then~ a\varded a.s a matter of right cannot be 
said to be a part of the "amount recovered" due to a judgment. 
The interest attaches~ by operation of la \V) to the amount 
recovered. Therefore the right to a p.art of that interest depends 
upon the right to a part of the principal and the proportion 
of the principal claimed determines the proportion of the 
interest which goes w.i th that principal. 
POINT THREE 
A CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT WHICH EX~ 
CLUDES $80~000.00 FROM THE COMPUTATION OF 
ATTORNEY FEES, LIKEWISE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
EXCLUDES THE ACCRUED INTEREST UPON THAT 
AMOUNT. 
An examination of· the contract under review (Appendix 
A of this brief) shows that it was the agreement bet?leen the 
parties that $8 0, 0 00.00 would be ex:cl uded from the con tt a.ct 
under which the plaintiffs were to receive their compensation 
for legal services. Plaintiffs contend that the interest earned 
by this $80 t 000.00 would be subject to their proportional a tto r-
neys' fees. The de£ en dan ts contend that as the $80~000. 00 was 
excluded from the contract, so then~ is the interest upon that 
amount~ 
As pointed out in Point T\\'O of this brief, interest is 
awarded in condemnation suits as a matter of right and the 
court could not withhold the a war~. of interest. Therefore, 
11 
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the employment of legal co uns e 1 to .secure this interest "\Vas 
not only unn eccssary but 'vas not contracted for by the parties 
involved. 
The intent of this contract~ and the Jegal proposition that 
the contract. must be construed in favor of the client~ clearly 
sho"~s that the parties exd ud ed from this ein ploy men t contract 
that which ~Tas already vested, that is, the $80,000.00~ (Exhibit 
t-D ~ R-40) r The right to interest had like"~ ise vested on this 
$80,000.00 prior to the employment of the attorneys under 
the con tract, and 1 i tiga tion 'vas unnecessary to recover it; th erew 
fore it cannot be said that the interest was con tern plated by 
either party to be a part of nany amount recovered'~ or "~of 
amoun t.s recovered.'' The reason for the exclusion of the 
$80,00 0.00 from the contract was that the K o hies could collect 
this amount without the necessity of litigation, likewise the 
interest upon this amount from the time of the taking under 
the Order of Immediate Occupancy until paid. The intent 
is clear and the legal inference in fa:vor of the client .shows 
that the interest on the $80,000.00 \Vas not to be taken into 
account under the con tract 
A similar case to the one now under review by this court 
arose in Tennessee in Sanders v ~ Riddich~ 12 7 Ten o. 700~ 15 6 
S.W. 464. In that case the attorney and client entered into a 
contingent £ ee contract which provided for attorney's fees 
of one-third of any recovery if under $12,000.00 and one-fourth 
if over $1 2 j 000.00. Judgment \vas recovered in the amount of 
$11, 5 00.0 0, but with accrued interest the total amount collected 
amolinted to $12,788.00. The plaintiff in this action, the 
eli en t, contended that the attorney v..ras en titled to one-fourth 
12 
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only, as the amount recovered was in excess of $12,000.00+ The 
Supreme Court of Tennessee rejected the claim of the eli en t 
and in ruling in favor of the attorney said~ 
"That recovery was for less than $12~000.00 and the 
rights of the attorneys attached thereto on a 1/3 basis. 
T l1 e interest accrued~ in le gat con tern p J a tion, on the 
respective aliquot parts/' 
The Arizona Supreme Court 1n dealing with a similar 
situation involving a contingent fee contract said in the case 
of Covert v. Randles~ 53 Ariz. 22 5~ 8 7 P ~2d 488: 
tiWe think the correct rule for construing contracts 
for contingent fees is well stated in 7 Corpus Juris 
Secundum, .Attorney and Client, p. ·1 089] Sec. 191~ as 
follows: 
'A con tin gent fee is general I y reckoned on the net 
amount actually recovered by the client through the 
e£f o rts of the attorney~ or through a pro per settle-
ment by the client.~ 
'Under a contract for a contingent fee, the pet-
rentage to ~rhich the attorney is entitled and the 
amount or property on which it is to be based de-
pend on a fair and reasonable construction of the 
terms of the agreement; and such £ ee general i y is 
recoverable only on the property or funds, within 
the terms of the contract, which are recovered by 
reason of the attorney's efforts~ and~ therefore, is 
not recoverable on uncontested claims or sums vol-
untarily paid.~ ~t 
Under the definition as adopted by the Arizona court~ 
where the attorney does nothing to earn the fee he is not en-
titled to any part of that amount ·~vhich is recovered. In the 
present case, the in teres t which is a warded by the State of 
Utah .as a _matter of right stands as a payment ~n an uncon& 
13 
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tested claim or which is a voluntary pa ym en t by the people 
of the State of Utah to · a citizen who has had his property 
taken £or the public good, but 'v ho has been de] a ycd i I 1 the 
receiving of the money. 
The State of Nev.·· York has settled the matter of the 
interpretation of a contingent fee contract in condemnation 
cases where there is cliff icu l ty in the division of the interest 
between attorney and client. This matter has been litigated 
repeatedly and the. Supreme. Court of New York relies upon 
its decision in Bassford v. Johnson~ 172 N.Y. 488~ 65 N.E. 
260, in rendering its opinions. In that case certain land was 
being taken by condemnation. The landowner retained an 
attorney on a contingent fee contract which provided that the 
a~mey was to· collect as his fee nlO% of whatever award 
may be obtained for my (Johnson~s) land~'~ A judgment was 
obtained and interest allowed by the court on the judgment, 
which interest was in excess of $13,000.00. The defendant, 
Johnson, the 1 an downer, contended that the attorney was 
entitled only to 10% of the judgment and none of the interest. 
The Supreme Court of New York ruled that the attorney was 
entitled to his proportion a 1 share of the interest. The court 
said~ 
4 ~By its terms the attorney \\·as to receive for his 
services 10% of 'vhatever a\vatd may be obtained for 
Johnson's 1 and. The ti tie to the land was taken~ as we 
have seenj by the city on the 1st day of July~ 1897, and, 
i£ the award had been then made., the attorney, unw 
questionably would have been entitled to 10 per cent 
the reo£ and the i nte rest thereon that thereafter ace rued 
do\vn to the date of the payment; but the award \vas 
not tnad e until nearly four years thereafter+ But when 
14 
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made, it was for the value of the land at the time that 
the title \vas taken by the city~ and therefore) so far as 
interest is concerned, the a \v a rd is deemed to have been 
made of that date, so that the effect is the same as 
if the award had been made on that day and payment 
postponed for four years thereafter. 11 
It is submitted that this is exact! y the s arne si tua tio n in the 
case now before the court~ The a\vard of $140~000.00 made 
by this courtt State v. Noblet ____ U. ____ , ~~~- P.Zd -~--~relates back to 
19 55 when the land in 9uestion was taken~ The recovery in 
this case then ~·as the amount of the award of the court. The 
accrued interest v.,roul d attach to the respective pro rata parts 
of this recovery, which ~Tas divided between the attorney 
and client urider the employment agreement. The interest, 
therefore, on the excluded amount of $80,000.00 \Vas not a 
part of the ~~amount recovered.'' 
A case whe1ein a similar problem of dividing interest 
arose in Smith v. \X'hitma.n~ 159 rvid. 478~ 150 A. 856. This 
case involved the taking of land by condemnation by the 
federal government during World War I. At the time of the 
taking in 191 7 the government offered the Jan downers 
$3,000.00, which was unacceptable to them. The landowners, 
de£ en dan ts~ retained the plaintiffs to .fi.gh t the case £or them. 
They entered in to a con tin gent fee con tract \V herein the a ttor-
neys 'VIt'ere to get one-third of all amounts recovered in excess 
of $3~000.00. At the time of the making of the contract between 
the attorneys and clients, the federal government did not pay 
interest on land taken by condemnation for actions prosecuted 
through the federal court of claims. However, in 192 3~ during 
the pendency of the action) the Supreme Court of the L"!nited 
States, in a decision, ruled that interest would be paid from 
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the time of the taking of the 1 and until entry of judgment. 
The attorneys for 10 years pursued the case until eventually 
they received a judgment for $106~072.29, which included 
interest, principal and court costs. In computing the attorney 
fees the following method was used: The first $3)000.00 was 
excluded as provided in the contract of employment, then the 
interest which had accrued on this $ 3 ~ 000 + 00 1 ikewis e \ .... as 
excluded. This in tcre.) t a. mounted to $3) 5 13.7 5. The attorneys 
then computed their fee upon the one-third basis as set forth 
in the contract. This method of computation \vas adopted by 
the trial court as correct. The Supreme Court of Maryland 
<.:oncurred with the computation method~ but reversed on the 
grounds that even though there was no dispute as to the 
method employed~ it \vas a jury~s prerogative to decide this 
matter and not the courts. 
The defendants in the case now before this court contend 
that the same method of computation with regard to the 
.$80,000.00 excluded frotn the contract should be employed 
as was done in the Smith v. Whitman case. In the present case 
the interest upon the $80,000.00 amounts to the sum of 
$13,865.35 (Exhibit No. 10) which, \vhen added to the 
$80,000.0 0, makes a total exclusion from attorneys fees of 
the swn of $93,865+3 5. 
Under the contention of the plaintiffs (attorneys), this 
entire amount of $13,865.35 is subject to the contingent fee 
seale~ Vot' hich pI aces the entire amount in the bracket of 50 r; r 
attorney fees or, in other words~ the interest on the $80) 0 00.00 
exc I uded under the terms of the con tract is divided one-half to 
the attorneys and one-half to the clients) or $6,9 32.67 to the 
16 
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attorneys as fees upon an amount excluded from the contract 
of employment. 
It may be · readi 1 y seen that it would be to the advantage 
of attorneys to ex tend as long as possible the adjudication of 
matters such as this \vhere such a contract of employment exists. 
Such a division of this interest is not only unconscionable 
but was not the intention of the parties at the t i£9-e of t h c 
making of the contract It is inconceivable that anyone would 
exclude $80~ 000~ 00, the amount that they had already been 
offered, and would offer to share the interest which ·~vould 
accrue upon this amount and which would be payable without 
the necessity of 1 itigation or representation of an attorney. 
As nothing was required on the part of the attorney~ to 
obtain this interest) they are not entitled to any part of it. As 
stated in the Covert v. Randles case cited above: 
!tlf the contingent fee agreed upon ¥t'ete out of propor~ 
tion to the services to be rendered, it would be the duty 
of the court to deny recovery on that account. ~t 
Covert v. Randles 
53 Ariz. 225, 87 P.2d 488 
The tria] court erred in allowing the plaintiffs one-half 
of the accrued interest on the exempted $80,000.00, and this 
ruljng must as a rna tter of Ia w be reversed and the amount of 
1nterest allowed by the trial court to the plaintiffs be returned 
to the defendants~ 
POINT FOUR 
A CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT FOR A TTORL\~EYS 
FEES WHICH IS BASED UPON OBTAINING COMPEN-
SATION FOR LAND BEING CONDEIVI!\1ED DOES NOT 
17 
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INCLUDE AS PART OF THE RECOVERY THE INTEREST 
PAID AS AN INCIDENT. TO THE RECOVERY. 
The plaintiffs) attorneys, were retained by the defendants 
to represent them in the iitiga tion with the State of Utah to 
determine the value of the land being condemned. The exact 
scope of the plain tiffs' ern p loyment is set forth in the e1n-
ployment agreement in plaintiffs· own words (Exhibit 1-D) : 
~ ~ 3 _ Attorney 5 agree to represent CJ ien t in a goodl 
diligent and professional manner in obtaining compen· 
sation for Client from the State of Utah for land being 
condemned .. '' 
As stated heretofore~ inter est is awarded in the State of 
Utah in condemnation matters as a matter of right, and there-
£ ore it is unnecessary for anyone, including the defendants 
in this action, to retain attorneys to enforce his right to interest 
on a\vards in eminent domain cases. This fact was \vell known 
to the attorneys at the time of the making of this contract. 
Therefore, as the question of interest was not under dispute 
with the State of ·utah, the attorneys were not representing 
the ~·Client, t j defendants) in obtaining interest as a part of 
the compensation for the taking of the land. 
As seen heretofore~ the Supreme Court awarded the sum 
of $140~000.00 as compensation to the Nobles for the taking 
of their land. The interest was awarded under the mandate 
of the Legis laturel which provides that interest will be a warded 
v-.-~here there has been a forbearance of money. The attorneys 
themselves stipulated that their services were to the obtaining 
of compensation for the J and, and the schedule of fees tQ 
be charged was for that service~ 
The headnotes of a series of condemnation cases decided 
18 
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in 1941 in Illinois, entitled People ex rel v. Kelly, Mayor et al, 
32 N.E. 2nd 920, 921 (Case No. 1 and 2) 922, 923, states: 
t 
4The interest on a condemnation judgment cannot 
be con side red pa r:t of the value of the land taken~ and 
right to interest is not by virtue of judgment or the 
judicial proceedings cu Imina tin g thcr ein but so 1 ely un-
der statute.'' 
There£ ore~ the entire in tere5 t which had accrued under the 
award of $140,000.00 was excluded from the contract~ but 
accrued as to the aliquot parts that the attorneys and the 
defendants were entitled to after the division of the $140,000.00 
under the terms of the contract. 
The case5 cited in Point Three of this brief are all a pp li-
cable as to the proposition of law that the entire amount of 
interest should be excluded from the contract as the interest 
does not constitute a part of the tt amount recovered j' under the 
contract under review. 
The schedule of attorneys' fees is based upon '"services 
to be rendered in this rna tter ~ ~ (Exhibit 1 w D, Paragraph 2) . 
No services were expended for the collection of interest. 
In the Cali for ni a case of Ho llings"W~o r th v. Le~v is, 9 3 Cal. 
App. 526~ 269 P. 709, the Court examined a contingent fee 
contract "i;Vhich provided for ''50% of refunds~~ as compensation 
for the attorney~ s services. The court stated: 
·~As the contract \jjtas tnade between an attorney and 
his client, the ambiguity should be resolved against the 
attorney and in favor of the client.~' 
1~he ambiguity of ~hich the court speaks is w~ether or 
not. int~rest ~warded on the refunds made is.~. part of the 
19 
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t~ refund.'· The court ruled that under the tenus of the contract 
the attorneys \vere t~ receive as compensation 50~X:· of the 
t ~refunds' t and not of all sums collected, and there£ ore the 
interest vJtas excluded f rorn the contract as interest is not a 
refund. 
T'his i.s the sa me situation as in the instant case. Here, 
the attorneys contracted to use their bcs t efforts in securing 
compensation for. the taking of the Jand. This could only mean 
the value of the land at the time of the taking. Bassford vs. 
Johnson, cited in Point Three. 
The plaintiffs insist that the words ~~amounts recoveredn 
and "any amount recovered" mean both principal and interest. 
r;nder their theory} costs awarded by the court likewise should 
be inc I uded as part of the recovery to \V hich the attorneys are 
entitled~ even though the defendants have borne all the costs 
themselves. It is obvious that this is not the law. 
It is submitted that the entire contract must be read and 
interpreted in light of the meaning of the entire documentl 
and not upon a single phrase of that contract. 
~~An agr ecm en t should be interpreted as a whole 
and the meaning gathered from the entire context! and 
not from part icu 1 a r "\VO rds :t phrases or clauses. In fact~ 
the en tire agreement is to be considered to determine 
the meaning of each part.'· 
12 Am. Jur. 772, Contracts, Sec. 241 
The Utah Supreme Court~ in the case of Vitagraph Inc. v+ 
American Theatre Co., 77 U. 71~ 291 P. 303, 306~ stated: 
~~In construing a contractl however) -=the interpreta-
tion must be upon the entire instrument and not merely 
on disjointed or particular parts of it. The whole con· 
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text js to be considered in ascertaining the intention 
of the parties, even though the immediate object of 
inCJUiry is the meaning of a.n isolated clause.~ n 
It is co needed that the words used ln the agreement must 
be examined to see what their meaning isj and therefore \Ve 
wish to cite additional authority as to the meaning of the 'vords 
Hamount reco¥ered." The meaning must, however~ be applied 
to the intent of the entire con tract. 
The Supreme Court of Nev..,· Mexico~ in the case of Cand el.a-
ria v. Cutie.rrez~ 28 N Jvl. 4 34, 213 P. 103 7, ruled that the mean-
ing of the phrase, ~·amount of judgment~~~ means the tiamount 
for which a recovery Is to be had~ without reference vlhatever to 
the accumulations attaching thereto by \Vay of interest and 
costs."' This case centered· around the interpretation of a 
statute of New Mexico ~Thich req uircd the posting of a super .. 
sedeas bond for the ~ ~ a.moun t of the judgment.'' 
The Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of Atlantic 
Coastline R. Co. v. Coadunan~ 52 So. 33 7, 59 Fla. 130, ren-
dered an interpretation of the meaning of the ph rase ·~amount 
recovered.'~ In that case, the court· said: 
''We think the amount recovered means the amonnt 
of c I aim recovered, and not that amount plus the 5o% 
interest. The amount of claim recovered is made the 
basis of the 5 07o interest and the attorney fees allowed 
by the statute. * * * The amount of recovery relates 
to the disputed amount of the claim; and 507o not 
being recovered in this sense but allo\v ed by th c 
statute.t' 
As stated before~ in Ctah the disputed claim is as to the 
value of the property at the time of the taking by the party 
condemning it. Therefore, interest V\o'hich is a~v·arded for_ the 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time of the forbearance of the payment of this sum is not 
included in the ··amount of recovery+" I'he Utah courts have 
defined r. compensation'' in the law of em in en t domain as a 
recompense in value~ a quid pro quo~ and stated that it must 
be paid io money. Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Fox, 28 l~. 
311) 78 P .. soo. 
Under th c ruling of the T enncssee case of Sanders v. 
Riddich ~ cited in Point Three, v..rhich cited \Vi th approval tb e 
N e\v Y ark case of Bassford v. Johnson, likewise cited in Point 
l"hree, the entire amount of interest ··accrued in legal con-
templation, on the respective aliquot parts" of tbe judgment+ 
That is to say, the attorneys were entitled to the interest that 
their proportional share of the $140~000.00 earned during 
the period of forbearance) and the Nobles were entitled to the 
inter est that their pro portion a [ share of the $140,000.00 earned 
during the same period. 
POINT FJVE 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED 1~0 INTEREST ON 
ALL SUlviS ADVANCED PLAINTIFFS FROM 1~HE TI~lE 
OF THE ADVANCE LT~TIL TIME \X'HE2\1 PLAINTIFFS 
WERE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
The record sho,vs) and it is not disputed, that the de--
fendants advanced the plaintiffs sums of money which were 
retained by the a ttorncys as advanced attorney fees. These 
sums are $360.00 paid )uJy 5~ 1956) and $3~500.00 paid June 
5, 1958 (Exhibit No. 11). 
Defendants filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff sl and 
alleged the payment of the .$3)500.00, and the plaintiffs tn 
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replying to the counterclaim admitted receiving the money. 
The trial court erred in refusing to award defendants 
interest upon the sums so paid the plaintiffs. Defendants are 
entitled to this interest as at the time of the payment of the 
$360.00 no judgment had been rendered in the condemnation 
suit~ and this constitu ed a payment of attorneys fees \V hich 
were contingent upon there being a recovery in excess of 
$80,000.00~ Likewise, the $3j 500.00 was paid prior to the 
confirmation of the judgment by the Supreme Court and vras 
paid out of the $72 ,000~ 00 paid by the State to the Nobles 
in June~ 1958. As the entire $72,000.00 belonged to tbc Nobles 
free of any attorneys fees, an advance to the attorneys con-
stituted merely a loan to them on which the Nobles are en-
titled to interest. As shown under Exh !hit 8, th c interest u pan 
this $3t500.00 amounted to $16lr00. 
The court failed to make any £i ndings of fact or con-
clusions of Ia w with regard to the clef endants' counterclaim~ 
wherein the interest upon this $3~500.00 Vlas claimedt or any 
:findings of fact or conclusions of law \vith regard to the 
claimed offset of the interest upon the $360+00 from 1956 
unti i 19 59 on the claimed a. ttor n ey fees. This cons ti tu tcs error 
and the defendants are en tit led to a new trial to determine the 
matter of their counterclaim. 
The defendants j in their proposed fin dings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, set £ orth this co un tercla.im and off set, 
but the court refused to sign them+ 
3 Am. Jur. 660, Appeal and Error> Sec. 1147t states: 
~~The f ai 1 ure or refusal of the trial court to make 
.findings of facts rna ter ial to the decision is ground for 
rever5al on appeal by a party prejudiced thereby * * * ,. 
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It is obvious that the ignoring of defendants' co un tercl aim 
by .the court in making its findings and conclusions has preju-
diced the defendants and they have suffered materia 11 y. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure declares: 
·~ Fjndlngs by the Court_ (a) Effect. In all actions 
tried upon the facts ~·ithout a jury or with an advisory 
jury:~ the court shaiJ] unless the same are waived, find 
t h c facts s pcc:ia ll y and state sepa ra tel y its conclusions 
of la'v thereon and d.irect the entry of the appropriate 
judgtnent.~~ 
The court did not adhere to this rule and therefore it 
comJni tted revers i bJ e error, and the de£ endants arc entitled 
to a new trial to determine their counterclaim and off set to the' 
claimed attorneys' fees. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respect fu 1 J y s ubm i ttcd that th~ court erred in awarding 
plaintiffs judgment in the amount of $11,250.58~ and~ furthet) 
the court erred in not granting a judgment in favor of thc-
defendants and against plaintiffs in the amount of $227+ 1 );. 
as interest on the amount advanced to the plaintiffs by the 
defendants out of their a-vw~n funds+ 
If the pJ a in tiffs are en titled to anything, they are en" 
titled on1y to judgment in tbe amount of $1,125.03~ less. the 
amount of $227.15 accutnulated as interest in favor of de-
fendants and against p 1 a in tiffs+ 
The court further erred in not making a .finding of fact 
or conclusion of l a vl relating to the in teres t claimed by the 
defendants on the an1ount advanced to plaintiffs as hereinabove 
mentioned~ and therefore it is respectfully submitt.ed that the 
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court made a reversible error and defendants are entitled to a 
new trial as more pa rticula.r 1 y set forth under Point Five of 
this brief. 
Res pectfu 11 y ~ u bmi tted, 
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
APPENDIX A 
AGREE~lENT FOR EMPLOY~lENT OF A l'TORNEYS 
BRACK H. NOBLE and ANN C. NOBLE, his v..rife~ 
hereinafter called the Client, hereby agree 'vith HERBERT 
B+ MAW~ WENDELL B. HAMMOND~ & GEORGE K. 
FADEL, attorneys at la V{ ~ here ina£ ter called Attorneys} as 
follows: 
l. Client hereby engages, designates and appoints Attar-
neys to represent Client in the pending condenmation proceed-
ings by State of utah against Oient, involving about nine 
acres of land of Clienfs located East of l; _ S. 91 and along 
the Davis-Salt Lake County boundaries. 
2. Oient agrees to pay said Attorneys for services to be 
rendered in this n1a tter as fo I lows: 
(a) 15% of amounts recovered over $80:t000.00 up to 
$90,000.00. 
(b) 257'0 of amounts recovered over $90~000.00 up to 
$110JOOO.OO. 
(c) 30% of atnounts recovered over $110,000.00 up to 
$120,000.00. 
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(d) 50% of any amount recovered over $120,000.00. 
3~ Attorneys agree to represent Client in a good~ diligent 
and professional manner in obtaining compensation for Client 
from the State of Utah for the land being condemned. 
WITNESS the hands of the parties this 12th day of 
January1 1956. 
/s/ B. H~ Noble 
/s/' Ann C. Noble 
CLIENT 
lsi Herbert B. Maw 
Is! Wendell B. Hammond 
/s/ ... George K. Fadel 
ATTORNEYS 
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